Abstract. According to the theory-theory account of understanding other minds, children develop a succession of theories of mind that, just like scientific theories, postulate abstract coherent mental entities and laws, and provide predictions, interpretations and explanations. These, in turn, enable them to interact successfully with other people. Individuals with autism or Asperger's syndrome are said to be unable to theorize about other minds, resulting in difficulties in relating to the people around them. This paper explores the possibility that we can reconceptualize the assumed relationship from the other direction, proposing that it is misleading to construe the task of achieving social understanding as a logical, scientific one. Rather, it will be suggested that typical children do not have to theorize that there are minds as they can immediately experience other people's intentions and feelings within their affective, co-regulated interactions with them. Highfunctioning individuals with autism, on the other hand, do need to engage in theorizing about mind if they are to bridge the gap that exists between themselves and other people. In support of this argument, this paper presents findings from an interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) of ten published autobiographical accounts written by individuals diagnosed with either high-functioning autism or Asperger's syndrome.
For the past two decades, autism has provided a model for exploring the development of our understanding of other people as mental beings: a model which, according to some, has profoundly shaped conceptual thinking in this field (Frith & Happé, 1999) . The ability to make sense of other people is said to require the capacity to reflect on mental states, and it is widely accepted that autism is characterized by a specific difficulty in this area (BaronCohen, 1995) . This devastating developmental disorder, which affects around 1 in 1,000 people, was first identified as a distinct entity in the 1940s, almost simultaneously, by Leo Kanner (1943) in Baltimore, and Hans Asperger (1944 Asperger ( /1991 in Vienna, who both cited 'aloneness' as its cardinal feature (Sacks, 1995) (see Shanker, 2004 , for more on this history). At the present time no biological marker has been found, and diagnosis is made on the basis of the co-occurrence of certain behaviours, which onset before 36 months. The behaviours include abnormalities in the areas of social development, communicative development and imagination, together with marked repetitive or obsessional behaviour or unusual, narrow interests (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; World Health Organization, 1993) . 1 The predominant view in the developmental literature is that it is the apparent inability of individuals with autism to think about thought that explains their impairments in social relations, communication and imagination, all behaviours which are central to the diagnosis. More specifically, they are said to lack a 'Theory of Mind' (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) . The term 'Theory of Mind' (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute independent mental states (such as beliefs, desires, intentions, imagination and emotions) to the self and other people in order to explain and predict their behaviour (Premack & Woodruff, 1978) . According to Baron-Cohen (2000) , the capacity to reflect on the content of one's own and other minds, in turn, enables us to interact successfully with those around us. The cognitive processes underlying the development of a Theory of Mind are still a matter of heated debate (Gopnik, Capps, & Meltzoff, 2000; Leslie, 2000) . However, two positions have dominated the field. Whilst both argue for the development of a Theory of Mind, they disagree as regards the extent to which this is hard-wired or genetically programmed to mature over time. The first explanation, the modular view, is that evolution has equipped the brain with a Theory of Mind mechanism (ToMM) that helps the child to attend to the invisible states of other people, and which may be underpinned by a separate brain system (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith & Happé, 1999; Leslie, 1987) . In the second, 'Theory-Theory of Mind', young children are said to use their general intellectual capacities to develop a common-sense theory of mental states, in the same way that scientists are supposed to do, by examining evidence and testing hypotheses (Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990) . It is this second approach which will be primarily addressed in this paper.
Theory-Theory of Mind
The Theory-Theory of Mind approach draws close analogies between scientific theory and children's folk psychology (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992; Perner, 1991) . Our ordinary understanding of the mind is said to proceed by the formation, revision and replacement of successive theories of the mind (Gopnik, 1999; Gopnik et al., 2000; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992) . Children are said to understand the world by constructing coherent views of it and changing those views in light of the evidence they encounter in their daily lives. Indeed, it is argued that they are better theorists than adult scientists! As Gopnik and Wellman (1992) have put it, 'we would say not that children are little scientists but that scientists are big, and relatively slow, children ' (p. 168) .
Theories are abstract; they postulate hypothetical entities, such as gravity, that provide a separate causal-explanatory level of analysis to account for the things that we actually observe, like bodies moving in a particular way in relationship to each other. They also consist of theoretical constructs, which do not work independently from each other, but in systems characterized by interrelated laws or structures. Likewise, children postulate abstract, coherent mental entities (e.g. beliefs and desires) and laws (e.g. 'if an agent desires x, and sees it exists, he will do things to get it'), which together enable the child to make predictions, interpretations and explanations about their own behaviour and that of other people (Gopnik, 1999) .
It is not only in terms of their static features, though, that children's understanding of mind has been likened to a scientific theory. An interaction between theory formation and theory testing is said to drive the development of knowledge in children, just as it drives the historical development of knowledge in science. Theories develop and undergo change as a result of both internal structural factors within the theory, a drive for simplicity for example, and external factors such as the accumulation of evidence which confirms or runs counter to it. In the same way, children's views of the world are said to change in light of their active accumulation of counter-evidence, the gathering of new data and performing of experiments.
Theory-theorists do not, however, argue that children construct their theories simply from 'raw', incoherent data. Rather, they suggest, the infant begins life with an innate 'starting state' theory (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992) . This provides an initial conception of the mind, which undergoes radical revision and reconstruction as the infant learns more about their own experiences and behaviours and those of other people. Gopnik and Wellman contrast this with the ToMM account proposed by Leslie (1987) , where a maturational mechanism is said to set limits on what a ToM might be like.
Theory-Theory and Autism
According to the theory-theory approach, three things are required for the normal development of an understanding of mind: an innate starting theory, an innate general theory-forming capacity and data from the environment. It has been proposed that autism may involve a deficit in one, or both, of the two innate structures posited (Gopnik et al., 2000) . It could be, and this is said to be the most likely possibility, that infants with autism have no initial theory of persons, or if they do, that this starts from a different place than that of the typically developing infant, with cascading negative consequences for subsequent development. Gopnik and colleagues (2000) cite evidence from a study by Dawson, Meltzoff, Osterling, Rinaldi and Brown (1998) which found deficits in imitation and in orienting to social, but not non-social, signals (e.g. handclap, voice versus rattle, music) as support for this hypothesis. An alternative possibility, they suggest, is that individuals with autism may have a more general difficulty with theoretical thinking itself, rather than a more specific problem with Theory of Mind. In other words, individuals with autism may never come to understand the mind in a genuinely theoretical way, even though they acquire a great deal of knowledge about human behaviour. They substantiate this argument by referring to the findings from their recent study, examining the deeper understanding of 'folk biology' in a group of high-functioning children with autism. They found that the children with autism were more often incorrect in their classification of animacy/inanimacy, compared to typical children matched for verbal IQ, and showed a less sophisticated understanding of biological concepts in their reasoning about why things were inanimate or animate.
Insights from High-Functioning people with an Autism Spectrum Disorder
According to the theory-theory approach, the great majority of us successfully develop a theory, or more accurately theories, about minds in a way that is akin to scientists, with the exception of those with autism, who are simply unable to do so. My aim is to turn this argument on its head. I will argue that it is misleading to present the task of achieving social understanding as a logical one, similar to that of a detached scientist observing behaviour and working out what is going on. Rather, it will be suggested that typical children do not have to theorize that there are minds as they already are able to make sense of other people, initially within their mutual, co-regulated interactions with them. In contrast, it is the high-functioning individuals with autism who need to engage in such theorizing about other minds, in the sense of explicit intellectualizing, if they are to bridge the gap that exists between themselves and other people. Failure to do this would leave them unable to explain and predict human behaviour well enough to function, with at least some success, in social situations.
In support of this argument, this paper presents findings from an interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) (Smith, 1996; Smith, Flowers, & Osborn, 1997; Smith, Jarman, & Osborn, 1999) of ten published autobiographical accounts/personal narratives written by high functioning individuals, diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Disorder.
IPA Study
Autism is a complex and heterogeneous disorder. As such, its manifestations cover a wide spectrum and individuals may have an IQ at any level (Happé, 1999; Wing, 1981) . Whilst some of those falling within this diagnostic category may be silent and aloof, have a low IQ, and be locked into stereotypical rocking and hand flapping, others are relatively highfunctioning, with intact speech and language skills (albeit pedantic and verbose), along with rarefied special interests. Such individuals may have a desire to interact with other people, but be awkward and odd in the way they make their approach (Happé, 1999) . By diagnostic convention, if an individual has an IQ in the normal range (or above), they are said to have highfunctioning autism (HFA). If they meet all of the criteria for HFA apart from the one specifying a history of clinically significant language delay and/or communicative difficulties, they are said to have Asperger's syndrome (AS) (Baron-Cohen, 2002) .
Analytic strategy. The ten autobiographical accounts of individuals diagnosed with either HFA or AS were analysed for recurrent themes relating to the individual's understanding of, and relationships with, other people using IPA (see Table 1 ). Themes emerged both within and across the individual narratives. The process of identifying these involved several steps. The first step comprised repeated reading of Temple Grandin's (1996) autobiography. Anything significant or interesting relating to her personal experiences of trying to understand and interact with other people was noted in the left margin. These comments included summaries of the content, associations, connections and preliminary interpretations. Grandin's narrative was chosen as the initial one to work from for a number of reasons. Her work inspired the project, it was the most extensive and detailed, and Grandin herself is probably the best-known individual diagnosed with HFA. In the next step, the text was reread and any emergent themes were identified, recorded in the right margin and tentatively organized. These were checked back with the data to ensure that any interpretations made were consistent with the written account. Attention was then focused on the themes themselves to define them in more detail and establish how they interlinked with each other. Following this, the same process was repeated with the personal narratives of the remaining ten individuals, with the initial theme list being edited, added to and modified accordingly. The themes were then ordered so as to produce a coherent research narrative.
Analysis
Analysis of the ten autobiographical accounts revealed a variety of themes, which emerged as recurrent understandings across all accounts. Four of these, those concerned specifically with the difficulties the writers' experienced in trying to relate to other people, and the coping strategies they devised to try to address these, are presented here (the complete analysis will appear in Williams & Kendell-Scott, 2004) . They include the sense of a wide, unbridgeable gap between themselves and other people, an awareness of the existence of social and emotional cues that were inaccessible to them, the coping strategies adopted to help negotiate social situations, and the limitations of those strategies in guiding successful interaction (see Table 2 for a summary of the themes and sub-themes).
Distance between self and other people. Most of the authors wrote about the great distance that they felt existed between themselves and other people. However, whilst this was a recurrent theme, there were differences in terms of how the individual authors conceptualized this gap. These are detailed below under the sub-themes detached scientist, alien and onlooker Detached scientist. Temple describes herself as a detached scientist, recording observational data. She comments that this is not how she thinks things should be, but that it is a position she has adopted as a result of not knowing how to relate to other people: When other students swooned over the Beatles, I called this an ISP -an interesting sociological phenomenon. I was a scientist trying to figure out the ways of the natives. I wanted to participate, but I didn't know how. In my high school diary I wrote: 'One should not always be a watcher, the cold impersonal observer-but instead should participate.' Even today, my thinking is from the vantage point of an observer. (Temple Grandin, 1996, p. 132) Liane also likens herself to a scientist collecting observational data but, unlike Temple, conveys a sense of fascination, rather than discomfort:
I was captivated with the way their hands moved when they spoke, how they would bend them into shapes that looked like little buildings or twirl them about as if the hands were the message. I watched people like a scientist watches an experiment. Never did I feel like I was looking in a mirror. Always did I feel that I was here and they were there. (Liane Holliday Willey, 1999, p. 42) Jim 2 describes how, after reading a number of anthropologists' studies of 'strange cultures and far-away lands' (Prince-Hughes, 2002, p. 67) , he decided to deal with his autism by becoming an 'anthropologist' and adopting the same methodology to study the 'normal' culture he lived in:
I can remember thinking that the worlds they [anthropologists] studied were as strange to them as the world around was to me-so the same methodology should teach me about my world. (Jim, in Prince-Hughes, 2002, p. 68) Alien from outer space. In his autobiography Edgar argues that Temple Grandin's description of herself to Oliver Sacks (1995) as 'an anthropologist on Mars' (p. 233) should be amended to read 'an anthropologist from Mars' (Edgar Schneider, 1999, p. 99) if it is to fully capture the extent of the gulf he feels exists between himself and other people. Jim Sinclair (1992) describes himself as an extraterrestrial in need of an 'orientation manual' The onlooker. A number of writers describe themselves as onlookers to the human interaction that they observe going on around them. Both Wendy and Garry's personal narratives convey a sense of an individual left standing still, whilst the rest of the world moves on:
One of the best ways of understanding what autism is like is to imagine yourself as a perpetual onlooker. Much of the time life is like a video, a moving film I can observe but cannot reach. The world passes in front of me shielded by glass. (Wendy Lawson, 2001, p. 1) It was as if I was a seed frozen in time. The other seeds were growing and developing and I was getting further and further out of step and never looked like catching up. (Garry Burge, in Prince-Hughes, 2002, pp. 2-3) In both accounts there is a sense that the gap between themselves and other people is unbridgeable. Other writers share this sense of being an onlooker, but present it as more of a positive choice in the sense that it is a situation that they clearly enjoy, or feel more comfortable with than actually participating in interaction:
In the tree I could watch everything around me without having to interact. . . . I was an avid observer. I was enthralled with the nuances of people's actions. (Liane Holliday Willey, 1999, p. 26) A [computer] system with multiple lines, it provides an ideal atmosphere to observe social interaction without leaving the home. I have found the situation that I am most comfortable in is one where I am with others and alone at the same time. (Thomas McKlean, 1994, p. 49) Social and emotional cues are 'hidden' or inaccessible. Most of the personal accounts revealed difficulties in picking up both the non-verbal and verbal social and affective information that helps mediate human interaction, such as particular gestures, physical changes, facial expressions and tone of voice. This theme encompasses the following sub-themes: the mysterious/ enigmatic nature of social interaction; difficulty in picking up cues that are 'hidden' or uninterpretable; an inability to pick up social and emotional cues due to sensory problems; and development of the ability to 'pick up' social and emotional cues.
The enigmatic nature of social interaction. Some of the writers describe human interaction as completely mysterious to them: 'Humanity is basically nothing but an enigma to me ' (Thomas McKlean, 1994, p. 50) ; 'For me, the ordinary interactions of my daily social experiences have always been a great mystery ' (Wendy Lawson, 2001, p. 8 ). Liane's discussion of the difficulties she faced in the arena of intimate relationships echoes this sense of something mysterious and hidden, but she adds the point that she deliberately chose not to look too closely at it as this caused anxiety:
The men I had been dating were nice men who shared some of my interests and hobbies, but with each of them there was always an unspoken and unseen something that stood between us-like the curtain that kept the truth of the Wizard from the people of Oz. I never gave a thought to what the curtain was hiding because when I did, it led me to distraction. (Liane Holliday Willey, 1999, p. 78) Difficulty in picking up 'hidden' social and emotional cues. Some of the other writers talk of being aware that 'something' is going on, but that they are unable to interpret it: 'I sometimes notice the cues but I don't know what they mean' (Jim, in Prince-Hughes, 2002, p. 300) . Both Temple and Edgar use metaphors relating to music in their efforts to try to explain to the reader their feeling of being unable to 'tune into' the emotional resonance that they see as characterizing social interactions:
Real-life emotions appear to me to consist of things felt in an unexpressed manner, and with another person also feeling them, almost in the manner of sympathetic vibrations at a resonant frequency. (Edgar Schneider, 1999, p. 52.) During the last couple of years I have become more aware of a kind of electricity that goes on between people, which is much subtler that overt anger, happiness, or fear. I have observed that when several people are together and having a good time, then speech, and laughter follow a rhythm. . . . The problem is that I can't follow this rhythm. (Temple Grandin, 1996, p. 91) It is not only cues relating to body language that are said to be difficult to pick up. Liane describes the difficulties she had in accessing the sub-text of verbal conversations:
I understood their language, knew if they had made grammatical errors in their speech, and I was able to make replies to anything that was spoken to me; but I never came to hear what they were really saying. . . . Suffice to say that, at this point, I was unable to read between the lines. Subtext and innuendo may as well have been birds flying by my window. (Liane Holliday Willey, 1999, p. 56) Difficulty in picking up social and emotional cues due to sensory problems. Most writers comment on the disruptive effect their sensory problems have on sustaining social engagement. Not only do they report that they are hyper-or hypo-sensitive to everyday sounds, smells, tastes, lights and textures easily tolerated by us (see Shanker, 2004) , they also comment that they actually perceive things, including the social cues that mediate interaction, differently, and have difficulty switching their attention between visual and auditory senses:
Since people with autism require much more time than others to shift their attention between auditory and visual stimuli, they find it more difficult to follow rapidly changing, complex social interactions. (Temple Grandin, 1996, p. 138) I still have problems in groups where there is too much information going on, or where the informational flow is too fast. I simply can't shift my attentional focus quickly enough to the relevant part of the interaction process. Consequently, I miss a lot of vital information needed to interpret social messages. There is no such thing as adequate delayed social interaction. One either is quick enough to keep up, or one is weird and socially disabled. (Darius, in Prince-Hughes, 2002, p. 25) Jim Sinclair (1992) attributes his inability to pick up social signals to the fact that the way in which he interacts to the world in a sensory sense differs from that of other people: 'Sometimes I'm not aware of social cues because of the same perceptual problems that affect my understanding of other aspects of the environment ' (p. 300).
Development of the ability to 'read' emotional cues. It is clear from a number of accounts that the reported lack of awareness of, and inability to pick up on, the subtle social and emotional signals that oil the wheels of human interaction are not things that necessarily are unchangeable. For example, whilst Liane had difficulty in her college days in tuning into emotional signals, over time, and in the context of a stable relationship, her ability to do so increased: I could not intrinsically or intuitively fathom what lay in the shadows, things I can now identify as the cornerstones for patience, flexibility, empathy and objectiveness. Before I came to terms with myself, these emotions were held at bay, nearly in my vision but just beyond my reach. It took years with my husband before I could swim into each one. (Liane Holliday Willey, 1999, p. 78) Wendy reports that careful study of the body language of other people has enabled her to distinguish between different emotions:
I have learnt to recognise the subtle differences between anger, frustration and disappointment, and understand why I feel these things. By studying an individual's posture, actions, voice tone and expression, I can now usually work out what they are feeling. The hard work of studying the reactions of others and recognising that people respond differently to different emotions has been very beneficial to me. (Wendy Lawson, 2001, pp. 8-9) Coping strategies. Most of the writers comment on the fact that they had consciously set about devising explicit strategies designed to help them negotiate social situations in the absence of social intuition that we take for granted: 'Most people take the routines of life and day-to-day connections for granted. The fact that they can see, hear, smell, touch and relate to others is "normal"' (Wendy Lawson, 2001, pp. 2-3) . These strategies are detailed below under the sub-themes studying other people's behaviour, the imposition of rules, and the use of a 'visual library'.
Studying other people's behaviour. Linking back to Wendy's comments, cited earlier, regarding the fact that her close study of people's body language had enabled her to differentiate certain emotions from each other, a number of writers made similar allusions to using their study of other people's behaviour to guide their own actions:
I had no insight into social conventions which regular people take for granted. . . . I find myself studying young people to see how they work, talk to one another, what interests them and how they dress. (Garry Burge, in Prince-Hughes, 2002, pp. 2-3) Sometimes, though, the help of someone else was required to 'interpret' these 'findings':
What can I do better to fit in with mainstream society? I think I have found a possible solution. I have been lately very careful to observe society and interaction. There are many ways that people communicate and many things that they do while they are together that simply make no sense to me. Sometimes I make a note of these things I see, and then I contact someone who knows me well enough to answer my question about it in a way that I can understand. (Thomas McKlean, 1994, p. 50) Imposing rules. As a result of their lack of social intuition several of the writers reported that they had devised their own system of rules to help them to manage social situations:
Since I don't have any social intuition, I rely on pure logic, like an expert computer program to guide my behaviour. I categorize rules according to logical importance. It is a complex algorithmic decision-making tree . . . I constructed a decision-making program for whether rules could be broken, by classifying wrongdoing into 3 categories: 'really bad', 'sins of the system', and 'illegal but not bad'. Rules classified as 'really bad' (e.g. stealing, injuring another person . . .) should never be broken. The 'illegal but not bad' rules can often be broken with little consequence, e.g. speeding. The 'sins of the system' covers rules that have very stiff penalties for seemingly illogical reasons. Using my system has helped me negotiate every new situation I enter. (Temple Grandin, 1996, p. 103) I have had to develop, in order to function in society, a bit of thou-shalt-not and thou-must (what mathematicians call the 'cookbook approach'). (Edgar Schneider, 1999, p. 95) Jim talks about using 'task analysis' to deal with social 'tasks':
While I was busy trying to institute permanent changes in my behaviour, I developed an interest in lithic technology-stone tools. Writers spoke of 'tool kits'; it seemed they were combining the physical technology and the cognitive skills under this single heading. I began to consider adapting this to my needs. Such a 'tool kit' would consist, for my purposes, of a package of cognitive skills and behaviours to meet the needs of the situation. This led me to task analysis. For example in order to make coffee I need to: fill the reservoir on the coffee maker, put a filter in the basket, measure the coffee grounds. . . . In situations calling for social interaction, a similar package or 'module of behaviour' would allow me to carry out social 'tasks'. (Jim, in Prince-Hughes, 2002, p. 70) Both Temple and Edgar recognize that such rule-based strategies are very different from those generally used. They suggest that the major difference lies in the fact that the coping strategies they have developed are based on logic, rather than emotion:
There is a process of using my intellect and logical decision making for every social decision. Emotion doesn't guide my decision; it is pure computing. (Temple Grandin, 1996, p. 103) My thought processes . . . have been mathematically logical. I have been told, by more than one person and on more than one occasion, that I put too high a premium on logic and rationality, giving short shrift to the emotions. (Edgar Schneider, 1999, p. 20) Jim Sinclair (1992) echoes these thoughts, adding the point that these are adopted as a result of the lack of what he calls 'basic instinct': 'I have to use cognitive strategies to make up for basic instincts I don't have ' (p. 302) .
Not all of the writers who reported using rules to guide their behaviour said that they had devised their own rules. Dawn describes how she adopted and became obsessed with the already extant rules at school, in conjunction with watching how her fellow schoolmates behaved:
In first grade I became increasingly obsessed with rules. I studied people's behaviours and actions and read written rules carefully to try to make sense of my school community and fellow human beings. (Dawn Prince-Hughes, 2002, p. 110) Using a 'visual library'. Both Temple and Liane report making use of their superior visual memories to keep a 'record' of past social situations which they could access at a later date in order to search for solutions to new situations that they had encountered. Liane likens this to having a photo album which she searches to find a 'reliable picture to guide me along' (Liane Holliday Willey, 1999, p. 85) . Temple describes herself as having a library of video 'clips' which she can mentally 'play-back':
Over time I have built up a tremendous library of memories of past experiences, TV, movies, and newspapers to spare me the social embarrassment caused by my autism, and I use these to guide the decision process in a totally logical way. . . . Earlier in my life, my logical decisions were often wrong because they were based on insufficient data. Today they are much better, because my memory contains more information. (Temple Grandin, 1996, p. 137) Limited success of coping strategies. A recurrent theme throughout the writings is the inadequacy of the cognitive strategies devised by the writers in helping them deal successfully with the variety and complexity of the social situations that they encounter daily.
Failures of strategies in new/unexpected social situations. Jim reports on the failure of his 'module of behaviour' when he applied it for the first time during his participation in a basketball game. In the course of this game, he knocked another player over and didn't realize why this upset the other players. His response was to make revisions to his initial module, with the help of a 'neurotypical' friend, to deal with ethics:
. . . we classified things that most would consider 'manners'. None of it made sense to me, despite her attempts to explain, so we set some tentative rules and some default modes. If I'm unsure how to behave I can follow these rules. (Jim, in Prince-Hughes, 2002, pp. 70-71) Temple reports how, despite being equipped with both rules and her visual library, her responses to very unfamiliar or unexpected situations are still too slow, and she is left with feelings of fear and panic:
I still have problems with rapid responses to unexpected social situations. . . . I have no problems if I mentally rehearse every scenario, but I still panic if I'm not prepared for a new situation, especially when I travel to a foreign country where I am unable to communicate. Since I can't rely on my library of social cues, I feel very helpless when I can't speak the language. Often I withdraw. (Temple Grandin, 1996, p. 60) Liane describes how her 'photo album' of past situations was unable to guide her behaviour in new situations:
For some reason I cannot recall how to act as easily as I can recall how I did act. It is as if when I look backwards I see a photo album filled with vivid images and shapes, but when I try to look forward I cannot call to mind one reliable picture to guide me along. (Liane Holliday Willey, 1999, p. 85) She reports that when this strategy fails she ends up rehearsing every possible scenario that she can think of. Reflecting on this, she comments: 'Of course things rarely turn out exactly as I had rehearsed and so I suppose it will never be possible for me to always know how to act. The human saga is just not reliable enough for me to predict' (p. 85). Liane goes on to highlight the fact that sometimes social situations appear to be so complex that they are not easily dealt with by the use of a few rules: Do I really have to talk on the phone to anyone if I think the conversation is boring or a waste of my time? If there is a lapse in the conversation, am I supposed to hang up or tell a joke or just sit there? What if I like the person well enough, but I decide I can't stand one of their behaviours or habits? Can I tell them right away or do I have to wait a while, and if so, how long, and if not, what am I supposed to do to keep from focussing on their annoying habit? The questions are endless, and the concerns mountain high. This is why human relationships usually take me beyond my limits. (Liane Holliday Willey, 1999, pp. 68-69) Both Dawn and Wendy describe how the fixed rules they tried to impose on the behaviour of other children proved socially disastrous:
Often what they said or recorded as the rules were, in fact, not standard human practice. I began policing the playground to make sure students did not break the rules . . . Needless to say this did not go over well with my peers. (Dawn Prince-Hughes, 2002, p. 110) [I lacked] the know-how of friendship building. Most people felt uncomfortable with my egocentric and eccentric behaviour. I wanted things to go by the rules-and my rules at that! My clumsy efforts usually ended in trauma. (Wendy Lawson, 2001, p. 16) Wendy later goes on to report a difficulty in understanding the more flexible rules written by people who do not have an Autism Spectrum Disorder:
There are days when just trying to make sense of the rules for social interaction is too difficult. It is especially so when we take into account that individuals often write their own rules! For example it's fine to take your clothes off to have a bath, but only a model takes her clothes off for the photographer; or you can laugh at that story, even though it's about a fat lady, because it's a joke. (Wendy Lawson, 2001, p. 98) Difficulties in generalizing. One of the most common themes which emerged from the different personal narratives was the difficulty individual writers have in generalizing their learning, and their rules, from one situation to another. Wendy, for example, says of those with AS: 'they may learn the rules for a particular situation but will not know how to translate that into other situations ' (Wendy Lawson, 2001, p. 100) . Liane discusses the problem of generalization in the context of the difficulties she faces being a parent with AS:
One of my parenting problems is grounded in my inability to generalize information to specific situations. I am only a good problem solver under two circumstances: if there is no real right or wrong answer, for instance when I am writing a creative fiction story; and if there are very clear-cut answers, for example the kind that can be found when I design and conduct research studies. When flexible variables affect the situation, things like human emotions, social mores, hidden agendas, and personal biases, I am left without a clue . . . I approach each new obstacle we come to as if I have never met anything like it before. (Liane Holliday Willey, 1999, p. 102) Jim Sinclair and Darius both report on their difficulty in generalizing from one person to another: I don't have much sense of people-in-general as things to be involved with. And I don't know how to have prefabricated relationships; if I happen to be involved with some person-in-particular, I practically have to learn to talk all over again to develop a common language with that person. (Jim Sinclair, 1992, p. 300) I have to learn everything from the start again [if the environment changes] and the same is true if I meet someone new. Social learning does not transfer to different people or situations. (Darius, in Prince-Hughes, 2002, pp. 24-25) 
Discussion

The Nature of AS/HFA Theorizing
In what sense, if at all, can we say that the development of these writers' social understanding is theoretical in nature? The excerpts reveal that they are able to reflect on their own thoughts and feelings and attribute thoughts and feelings to those around them (see also Frith & Happé, 1999) . When they do reflect on the thoughts and feelings of other people it is clear that they infer the precise nature of these from close observations of behaviour. Some of the writers report that they are forced into this position as a result of their lack of 'social intuition', and write about the frustration they experience at having to engage in such hard work when other people appear to interact so effortlessly. A close study of the autobiographical accounts, however, suggests that these individuals do not regularly try to make sense of other people by 'theorizing', as such, about mind. Rather, they tend to generalize in the sense of explicitly intellectualizing certain social situations and trying to derive rules (or a library of visual images) that can be used more generally to help them understand and predict people's behaviour in any new situations they might encounter.
The personal accounts reveal that these individuals encounter a number of problems in trying to generalize from specific cases to help them deal more effectively with new social situations. A number of them apply their rules too rigidly, irrespective of context, resulting in wholesale rejection by other people. For them, the fact that other people break rules, adapt them, or even sometimes make up their own, does not make logical sense and frustrates them. Sometimes the application of a particular rule makes them pay attention to one aspect of a social situation, at the expense of another, with disastrous consequences (e.g. in the case of Jim and his first attempt to apply his 'behaviour module' to a basketball game). Whilst they find that a set of rules or visual 'cues' can often help them cope with clear-cut situations, they break down when 'flexible' human variables such as emotions are involved. Even when they have remembered a large number of such rules, some writers report that they still find themselves unequipped to cope with unexpected social situations. Moreover, this can itself lead to an individual being overwhelmed by the sheer number of rules that appear to be required to engage effectively with other people. As Liane argues, human interaction is just too unpredictable to be able to deal with using such strategies (Holliday Willey, 1999) . This insight has implications for the theory-theory view, since it suggests that the postulation of a set of theoretical constructs and laws, however extensive and coherent, would not, on its own, be sufficient to allow us to cope successfully with the unpredictability and complexity of interactions with other people. In addition, the autobiographical accounts reveal that the difficulties encountered are not so much in the learning of the rules, but in their application. Therefore, I would suggest that even if the individuals with HFA or AS could learn all the theoretical constructs and laws precisely as specified by the theory-theorists, they would need a wisdom beyond these to be able to apply them effectively to particular social situations. To the extent that proponents of the ToMM approach to ToM (Leslie, 1987) suggest that certain modules are automatically going through the moves of theorizing, but not drawing upon any wisdom apart from that theory, they are subject to this same criticism.
The Expert versus the Beginner
The comparison that Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1991) make between how an expert in a particular skill and a beginner go about their business captures some of this distinction in social understanding and interaction between typical individuals and those with AS or HFA. In their paper Dreyfus and Dreyfus counter the traditional view that expertise necessarily involves inference (which is the general view of those in AI and proponents of ToM). They propose instead that someone who is expert in a particular skill, who has talent and a great deal of involved experience, just sees what to do without applying rules. Whilst their performance may break down in unusual circumstances, typically the expert understands, acts and learns from their results without any conscious awareness of that process. Dreyfus and Dreyfus go on to suggest that, in contrast to the expert, someone who is new to a skill relies more on the use of rules and facts to guide their actions (just like a heuristically programmed computer), because of their lack of extensive situated experience.
The typical individual can be compared to the expert in terms of their ability to interact effectively and effortlessly with other people. I would argue that our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of other people, as well as our own, develops in the course of our mutual everyday interactions with other people, and as such is sensitive to subtle social nuances, and flexible enough to be transferred across different situations (see Shanker, 2004) . Such understanding is not theoretical in nature, either in the sense that we postulate and test out implicit abstract entities and laws, or in the sense of being encapsulated in a module, which automatically does that theoretical work for us. However, in the absence of the kind of sustained situated empathic interaction with other people that underpins our own social 'expertise', the writers with HFA or AS are forced to engage in explicit theorizing to try to make sense of social situations.
The Development of Situated Social Understanding
Proponents of both the theory-theory and modular approaches to ToM appear to assume that social understanding can only ever exist in the individual in the form of representations and conceptual schemas. The task of achieving social understanding has been presented as a logical one, similar to that of a detached scientist observing behaviour and working out what is going on. However, an alternative location is in the interaction between people. Reddy (1996 Reddy ( , 2003 argues that if the second person is taken into account (the 'you') which exists whenever a person is in emotional engagement with another, then there is no need to impute a mediating 'theory' to bridge the supposed gap between the individual and another person. Aspects of intentionality can be perceived that are not possible outside this relationship. In other words, understanding about the intentional relations of other people towards external objects emerges from prior understanding of other people's intentional relations with the self. Such engagements precede and inform, rather than derive from, conceptual representations of self and other. The limited research findings available regarding infants with autism (from pre-diagnostic home video-tapes and retrospective parental reports) support the argument that they may have difficulties entering into this kind of early affective relationship, which involves reciprocal turn-taking with their primary caregivers (Bernebei, Camaioni, & Levi, 1998; DiLavore, Lord, & Rutter, 1995) . Analysis of home video-recordings suggests that their behaviour in the first two years of life show a number of features that would function to disrupt the mutuality that typically characterizes early parent-infant interactions. These include a failure to look at faces, abnormal eye-to-eye gaze patterns, limited facial expressions, problems in imitating gestures/body movements, and difficulties in initiating interactions (Adrien et al., 1991 (Adrien et al., , 1992 Bernebei et al., 1998; Mars, Mauk, & Dowrick, 1998; Osterling & Dawson, 1994; Sparling, 1991) .
Conclusion
Whilst most of us do not usually have to engage in theorizing to mediate our understanding of, and relationships with, other people, those with HFA or AS do. In the absence of sustained experience of mutual empathic engage-ment with other people, and with their difficulty in reading social and affective signals, these individuals find themselves in a position where they have to intellectualize social interactions. They devise cognitive strategies, based on rules and past examples, to help them negotiate their way around the social world. However, such strategies are inflexible and often fail to take account of all the most relevant aspects of a social situation. The distinction that Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1991) draw between the expert and the beginner suggests that following any kind of theory would not lead to expertise in the field of social interactions. Even if we were to follow such a theory, we would still depend for its successful application on a wisdom that goes beyond the theory itself.
Proponents of Theory-Theory of Mind, in trying to formulate a set of theoretical concepts and laws to explain how we successfully deal with other people in our everyday lives, might be engaged in as futile a task as was Socrates in Plato's Euthyphro (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1991) . Euthyphro, a known expert in pious behaviour, resists Socrates' efforts to extract from him a set of abstract rules for determining piety, making it clear that his expertise is based on his own extensive situated experience, and not on rules. Even if Socrates had eventually managed to wrench an extensive coherent set of rules from Euthyphro, this still does not change the fact that these are not what Euthyphro himself uses to determine pious behaviour. In any case, as strongly suggested in the personal accounts written by people with HFA or AS concerning their social interactions, when rules are the only thing we can go by, our activity becomes inflexible and distressingly prone to failure. Notes 1. It is important to note that autism, as a diagnostic category, itself has a history, and that the way we (and individuals with this diagnosis) talk about it will be resourced by current theories and practices. 2. Jim's account formed part of a collection of autobiographical writings from individuals diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome, which were published together in a book edited by Dawn Prince-Hughes (2002) . Some of the writers did not give their surname or used a pseudonym. The name used in this paper is that used for identification by the individual concerned.
